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The	Eurozone	poses	challenges	for	labour	at	large	–
and	not	just	for	the	‘South’
In	the	aftermath	of	the	sovereign	debt	crisis,	trade	unions	in	the	Eurozone	periphery
suffered	heavy	defeats	in	policy-making,	as	governments	implemented	liberalising
reforms	against	their	opposition.	Some	scholars	saw	this	as	indicative	of	a	chasm	in	the
fortunes	and	interests	of	organised	labour	between	the	Eurozone’s	northern	core	and
southern	periphery.	However,	as	Philip	Rathgeb	and	Arianna	Tassinari	explain,	trade
unions	in	core	countries	are	not	insulated	from	the	risk	of	marginalisation.	This,	they
argue,	underscores	the	necessity	for	labour	cooperation	across	the	Eurozone	rather	than	a	reinforcement	of	North-
South	divides.
The	financial	crisis	of	2008	and	the	ensuing	sovereign	debt	crisis	that	engulfed	the	Eurozone	were	asymmetric
shocks	with	uneven	consequences.	Unlike	the	creditor	countries	of	the	northern	core,	peripheral	Eurozone
countries	such	as	Italy,	Spain,	Portugal	and	Greece	were	subject	to	various	forms	of	policy	conditionality,
mandating	the	implementation	of	deep	liberalising	reforms	in	exchange	for	the	receipt	of	financial	assistance	from
the	Troika	or	the	European	Central	Bank.	As	a	result,	trade	unions	in	the	periphery	suffered	heavy	defeats	when
governments	implemented	unprecedented	liberalising	reforms	of	labour	market	and	welfare	state	institutions.	The
uneven	impacts	of	the	Euro	crisis	governance	reinforced	a	common	narrative	highlighting	the	core-periphery
cleavage	between	the	‘North’	and	‘South’.	These	divisions	have	resurfaced	acrimoniously	in	the	recent	negotiation
of	the	EU	response	to	the	unfolding	Covid-19	crisis.
Yet,	in	a	new	study,	we	show	that	the	class	power	implications	of	the	EU	economic	governance	regime	cut	across
the	core-periphery	divide.	We	develop	this	argument	through	an	analysis	of	comparative	quantitative	indicators	of
labour	market	liberalisation	and	qualitative	process-tracing	of	trade	union	influence	on	policymaking	in	three	core
Eurozone	countries:	Germany,	France	and	Finland.	Our	findings	show	that,	especially	from	2015	onwards,	unions
of	core	Eurozone	countries,	such	as	France	and	Finland,	have	also	lost	influence	over	the	trajectory	of	labour
market	policy	when	these	countries	experienced	a	deterioration	of	their	relative	competitiveness	standing	vis-à-vis
Germany.
We	attribute	the	demise	of	union	influence	in	policy-making	across	the	core-periphery	divide	to	the	demands	posed
by	the	Eurozone’s	institutional	framework	to	stimulate	the	economy	through	a	downwards	adjustment	of	wages	and
thus	prices.	By	reinforcing	the	emphasis	on	cost	competitiveness	via	strong	wage	and	fiscal	surveillance,	the	EU
‘new	economic	governance’	introduced	in	response	to	the	Eurozone	crisis	puts	national	governments	under
enhanced	pressure	to	compete	against	each	other	on	wage	and	labour	market	flexibility	–	a	process	known	as
competitive	internal	devaluation.
This	dynamic	reinforces	governments’	preferences	and	employers’	demands	for	the	liberalisation	of	labour	market
institutions.	Our	findings	demonstrate	indeed	that,	although	not	exclusive	to	the	Eurozone,	the	enhanced	reliance
on	internal	devaluation	since	the	global	financial	crisis	in	2008	has	been	particularly	pronounced	therein.	By	way	of
illustration,	figures	1	and	2	show	how	the	liberalisation	of	labour	market	policy	institutions	–	both	in	employment
protection	legislation	(EPL)	and	collective	bargaining	–	has	been	more	pronounced	in	the	Eurozone	countries	when
compared	to	other	groups	of	advanced	capitalist	economies.
Figure	1:	Liberalisation	scores	across	policy	areas	in	the	Eurozone-11	and	in	comparator	country	groups
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Notes:	EPL	=	‘Employment	Protection	Legislation’;	IR	=	‘Industrial	relations’;	UB	=	‘Unemployment	and	out-of-work	benefits’;
ALMPs=	‘Active	labour	market	policies’.	Eurozone-11	=	AT,	BE,	DE,	EL,	ES,	FI,	FR,	IE,	IT,	NL,	PT.	Non-Eurozone	social	democratic
countries	=	DK,	IS,	NO,	SE.	Non-Eurozone	liberal	countries	=	AU,	CA,	NZ,	US,	UK.	Source:	Authors’	calculations	based	on	the
‘Liberalization	Database	1970-2013’	liberalisation	index	(Armingeon	et	al.	2019);	variables	lib_epl,	lib_ir,	lib_neb,	lib_almp.
Figure	2:	Determinant	level	of	wage	bargaining	in	the	Eurozone	core	and	periphery	and	in	comparator
country	groups
Notes:	Yearly	averages	by	country	groups.	Lower	scores	denote	greater	decentralisation	of	wage-setting.	Values	of	Level-D:
1=enterprise;	2=sectoral,	with	company	agreements	that	specify	or	deviate	from	sectoral	agreements;	3=sectoral,	binding	for	all
further	agreements;	4=cross-sectoral,	with	company	agreements	that	specify/deviate	from	central	agreements;	5=cross-sectoral,
sectoral	and	company,	with	lower	level	agreements	that	specify	or	deviate	from	higher	level	ones;	6=cross-sectoral,	with	sectoral
agreements	that	specify	or	deviate	from	central	agreements;	7=cross-sectoral,	binding	for	all	further	agreements.	Eurozone-11	core
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=	AT,	BE,	DE,	FR,	FI,	LU,	NL;	Eurozone-11	periphery	=	EL,	IE,	IT,	PT,	ES.	Non-Eurozone	social	democratic	countries	=	DK,	IS,	NO,	SE.
Non-Eurozone	liberal	countries	=	AU,	CA,	NZ,	US,	UK.	Source:	Authors’	calculations	on	ICTWSS	version	6.0	(Visser,	2019);	variable
Level-D	(level	that	determine	the	wage	clauses	in	collective	bargaining).
The	relative	standing	of	the	German	economy	has	been	central	in	driving	this	dynamic.	Given	its	dominant	position
in	intra-European	trade	and	its	outstanding	competitiveness	standing	in	the	wake	of	two	decades	of	aggressive
wage	restraint,	German	labour	costs	have	become	the	benchmark	for	the	Eurozone’s	wage	surveillance
mechanisms	and	domestic	collective	bargaining.	Germany’s	favourable	competitiveness	position	allowed	its	unions
to	extract	significant	policy	concessions	after	the	Eurozone	crisis	(e.g.	minimum	wage,	re-regulation	of	temporary
contracts).	However,	fiscal	rules	and	wage	surveillance	mechanisms	in	a	common	currency	union	created
pressures	for	other	countries	to	close	down	the	cost	competitiveness	gap	to	Germany.
Finland	is	a	case	in	point.	Despite	high	levels	of	union	power	and	corporatist	traditions,	it	experienced	reform
dynamics	similar	to	those	of	peripheral	Eurozone	countries	when	its	macroeconomic	position	deteriorated	in	the
aftermath	of	the	Euro	crisis.	From	2012,	flagging	export	performance	related	to	the	decline	of	the	ICT	and	forestry
sectors	contributed	to	a	deteriorating	current	account	balance	and	decline	in	productivity	growth.	The
recommendations	issued	by	the	European	Commission	framed	Finland’s	economic	woes	as	a	problem	of
competitiveness	to	be	addressed	through	internal	devaluation.	While	the	cross-bloc	Katainen	government	called	the
social	partners	to	restrain	wage	growth	relative	to	its	main	competitor	countries	(Germany,	Sweden),	the	centre-
right	Sipilä	government	pursued	an	aggressive	reduction	of	unit	labour	costs	(ULCs)	by	threatening	unilateral
legislative	intervention.	Sustained	union	protests	–	including	the	first	general	strike	in	20	years	–	were	not	sufficient
to	defuse	this	threat.
Eventually,	the	Finnish	union	confederation	subscribed	to	a	macro-concessionary	bargaining	agreement,	the	2016
Competitiveness	Pact,	which	involved	a	wage	freeze,	working	time	extensions,	a	shift	in	the	liability	for	social
security	contributions	from	employers	to	employees,	and	a	commitment	to	accept	collective	bargaining
decentralisation,	without	any	concrete	policy	concession	in	return.	The	words	of	the	then	Minister	of	Economic
Affairs	Olli	Rehn	underscore	the	similarities	between	the	Finnish	experience	of	labour	defeats	and	that	of	Eurozone
peripheral	countries	in	years	prior:	“…Finland	[is]	a	case	in	point	of	a	Northern	Eurozone	country	that	is	going
through	an	internal	devaluation	in	the	era	of	a	common	currency	–	and	pursuing	economic	reforms	in	the	spirit	of
Commission’s	recommendations	from	the	years	2010–	2014”.
Keeping	in	mind	their	different	starting	points,	the	scale	and	depth	of	internal	devaluation	implemented	in	the	core
countries	is	not	comparable,	in	absolute	terms,	to	that	which	took	place	in	the	periphery.	However,	within	their
country	context,	what	these	cases	have	in	common	is	that	trade	unions	consistently	lost	out	as	a	result	of	the
competitiveness	pressures	politicised	by	the	European	‘new	economic	governance’	framework.
In	sum,	our	findings	show	that	fiscal	rules	and	wage	surveillance	mechanisms	have	adverse	implications	in	terms	of
labour	class	power	across	the	core-periphery	divide.	Core	countries,	which	benefited	in	the	past	from	current
account	surpluses,	can	also	come	under	pressures	for	internal	devaluation	similar	to	those	experienced	by	the
South	if	their	growth	rates	slow	down	and	competitive	advantages	exhaust	–	and	unions	lose	out	accordingly.	The
French	and	Finnish	experiences,	for	example,	illustrate	how	the	Eurozone	interconnected	the	fortunes	of	trade
unions	across	the	core-periphery	divide.
Politically,	this	implies	that	the	fortunes	of	labour	movements	in	Europe	rest	to	a	growing	extent	on	their
transnational	cooperation	against	an	economic	governance	framework	that	contributes	to	competitive	internal
devaluation.	In	a	context	where	North-South	divisions	within	the	Eurozone	are	re-emerging	in	relation	to	the	Covid-
19	pandemic,	unions	would	do	well	to	recognise	their	common	cause	across	the	boundaries	of	the	core	and	the
periphery,	and	work	together	to	prevent	the	costs	of	the	current	crisis	being	shifted	once	again	onto	working	people.
The	alternative,	it	seems,	is	a	Eurozone-like	race	to	the	bottom.
For	more	information,	see	the	authors’	accompanying	study	in	Socio-Economic	Review
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	authors,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.
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